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   IN MEMORIAM
On September 6, 2012 23-year-old Sûreté du Québec Constable Katia Hadouchi was 
killed in a single vehicle crash while responding  to a domestic violence call in Saint-
Ambroise-de-Kildare.
Her patrol car left the roadway as she traveled on Kildare Road at 
approximately 7:00 pm.
Constable Hadouchi had served with the Sûreté du Québec for two 
years.
On October 6, 2012 33-year-old Sûreté du Québec Constable Donovan Lagrange 
succumbed to injuries sustained the previous day when he was struck by a vehicle on 
Highway 640, near Bois-de-Filion, at approximately 2:00 pm.
He had pulled over two vehicles for speeding  and was walking  back 
to his patrol car, which was parked in front of the vehicles, when he 
was struck. A fourth vehicle struck both of the cars he had pulled 
over and then struck him, throwing him approximately 30 meters.
Constable Lagrange had served with the Sûreté du Québec for nine 
years. He is survived by his wife.
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Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
“They Are Our Heroes. 
We Shall Not Forget Them.”
inscription on Canada’s Police and Peace Officers’ Memorial, Ottawa
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11
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15
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA, LLM. The 
articles contained herein are provided for 
information purposes only and are not to be 
construed as legal or other professional 
advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to 
this newsletter. If you would like to be added 
to our electronic distribution list go to www.
10-8.ca to subscribe.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal 
Analysis
www.jibc.ca
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 7-9, 2013
Mark your calendars. The British 
Columbia Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of British 
Columbia Police Academy are 
hosting  the Police Leadership 
2013 Conference in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. This is Canada’s largest police 
leadership conference and will provide an 
opportunity for delegates to discuss leadership 
topics presented by world renowned speakers.
“The Service of Policing: Meeting Public Expectations”
www.policeleadershipconference.com
see 
pages 
30-31
see pages 28-29
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
59 seconds:  change your life in under a minute. 
Richard Wiseman.
Toronto, ON: Vintage Canada, 2010.
BF 637 S8 W548 2011
Care and candor [videorecording]: making 
performance appraisals work.
Coastal AMI; [Virginia Beach, VA: Coastal Training 
Technologies Corp., c2006.
1 DVD-ROM (ca. 53 min.)
Presents strategies for conducting  performance 
appraisals including  preparation, separating  the 
person from the behavior, setting  goals, and using 
appropriate praise.
HF 5549.5 R3 C37 2006 D536
Change anything:  the new science of personal 
success.
Kerry Patterson et al.
New York, NY: Business Plus, 2011.
BF 637 C4 C42 2011
Cyber bullying [videorecording].
Edmonton, AB: Native Counselling  Services of 
Alberta; University of Alberta, Faculty of Extension, 
c2012.
1 videodisc (DVD) (23 min.) : sd., col. ; 4 3/4 in.
This documentary provides a rare glimpse into the 
kind of bullying  that takes place online. It explores 
how technology and changes in communication 
have affected how kids relate to each other in a 
world where hurtful information can become public 
in an instant. This program follows the experiences 
of four youth and includes interviews with Canadian 
expert Dr. Shaheen Shariff.
HV 6773.2 C925 2012 D1474
Design for how people learn.
Julie Dirksen.
Berkeley, CA: New Riders, 2012.
LB 1060 D57 2012
The emotional  life of your brain: how its unique 
patterns affect the way you think, feel, and live- 
and how you can change them.
Richard J. Davidson with Sharon Begley.
New York, NY: Hudson Street Press, c2012.
BF 531 D33 2012
The end of leadership.
Barbara Kellerman.
New York, NY: Harper Business, c2012.
HD 57.7 K447 2012
Enhancing  adult motivation to learn: a 
comprehensive guide for teaching all adults.
Raymond J. Wlodkowski.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, A Wiley Imprint, 
c2008.
LC 5219 W53 2008
First-time leaders of small  groups: how to create 
high-performing  committees, task forces, clubs, 
and boards.
Manuel London, Marilyn
London. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2007.
HM 736 L66 2007
Groupthink [videorecording].
written & directed by Kirby Timmons; produced by 
Melanie Mihal.
Carlsbad, CA: CRM Films, c1992.
1 videodisc (ca. 25 min.) : + 1 leader's guide (12 p.)
The late Dr. Irving  Janis first coined the term 
groupthink, a natural tendency to achieve agreement 
for the sake of group unity despite contrary facts and 
potentially dangerous consequences. Historical 
events are used to demonstrate the importance of 
group decisions. Group interactions that led to the 
space shuttle, Challenger, disaster of 1986 are 
probed in depth. An interview with Janis and a 
detailed analysis of the eight symptoms of  
groupthink are also included.
HD 30.23 G78 1992 D529 (Restricted to in-house.)
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Handbook of adult and continuing education.
edited by Carol E. Kasworm, Amy D. Rose, Jovita M. 
Ross-Gordon.
Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, c2010.
LC 5251 H28 2010
The handbook of experiential learning.
edited by Mel Silberman.
San Francisco, CA: Pfeiffer, c2007.
LB 1027.23 H36 2007
The leadership challenge [sound recording].
James M. Kouzes, Barry Z. Posner.
New York, NY: Gildan Media, p2007.
Two experts in leadership skills share their insights 
and stories on what it means to be in charge, 
offering  a workshop for those interested in  
improving their management skills.
HD 57.7 K68 2007
Managing conflict with direct reports.
Barbara Popejoy and Brenda J. McManigle. 
Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership, 
c2002.
HD 42 P66 2002
Leaders make the future:  ten new leadership 
skills for an uncertain world.
Bob Johansen; foreword by John R. Ryan.
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 
c2012.
HD 57.7 J635 2012
The power of habit: why we do what we do in life 
and business.
Charles Duhigg.
Toronto, ON: Doubleday Canada, c2012.
BF 333.5 D83 2012
Positive discipline [videorecording]:  how to resolve 
tough performance problems quickly...and 
permanently.
presented by CRM Learning;produced and directed 
by Timothy Armstrong.
Carlsbad, CA: CRM Learning, c2006.
1 videodisc (ca. 25 min.):  + 1 leader's guide (61 p.) + 1 
participant workbook (14 p.) + CD-ROM + reminder cards.
Based on the book: Positive discipline / by Eric Harvey, Paul 
Sims.
Dallas, TX: Walk the Talk Company, c2005. ISBN 
1885228627
Tra in ing  p rog ram fo r supe rv i so r s , u s ing 
dramatizations of performance issues and how to 
solve them through positive discussion, not punitive 
action. It follows a five-step process for correcting 
negative performance which includes: identify the 
problem; analyze the problem's severity; discuss the 
problem; document the discussion; and follow-up 
and monitor results.
HF 5549.5 L3 P67 2006 D526
Powerful  conversations: how high-impact leaders 
communicate.
Phil Harkins. 
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, c1999.
HD 30.3 H371 1999
Public speaking: an audience-centered approach.
Steven A. Beebe, Susan J. Beebe.
Boston, MA: Pearson Allyn & Bacon, c2012.
PN 4129.15 B43 2012
Scenes of compassion: a responder's guide for 
dealing with emergency scene emotional crisis.
by Timothy W. Dietz.
U.S.: Behavioral Wellness Resources Pub., 2009.
RC 451.4 D565 2009
Social intelligence: the new science of success.
Karl Albrecht.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass; Chichester: John 
Wiley [distributor], 2009.
HM 1106 A43 2009
Sourcebook on violence against women.
edited by Claire M. Renzetti, Jeffrey L. Edleson, 
Raquel Kennedy Bergen.
Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, c2011.
HV 6250.4 W65 S68 2011
Think smart: a neuroscientist's prescription for 
improving your brain's performance.
Richard Restak.
New York, NY: Riverhead Books, 2009.
QP 398 R47 2009
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CONTENTS POSSESSION MORE 
THAN OPERATING VEHICLE
R. v. Lincoln, 2012 ONCA 542
 
The accused, who was on probation, 
was stopped driving  a rental vehicle. 
Upon further investigation police 
discovered cocaine under the car’s 
steering  column and $800 cash in his 
wallet. He was charged with several offences 
including  possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking  (PPT), possessing  proceeds of crime and 
breach of probation.
Ontario Court of Justice
The judge held there was sufficient 
evidence of knowledge and control of the 
c o c a i n e t o j u s t i f y a f i n d i n g  o f 
possession.  In doing  so, the judge 
concluded that anything  found in the vehicle was 
prima facie in the accused’s de facto possession. As 
its operator, the accused had control of the vehicle 
and was considered to have control of its contents 
unless there was evidence indicating  otherwise. He 
was convicted of the offences. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused successfully appealed 
the lower court’s ruling. The trial 
judge improperly applied a 
presumption that deemed the 
accused, as the vehicle operator, to have knowledge 
and control of its contents in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary.  “No rebuttable 
presumption of knowledge and control for purposes 
of determining  possession, based solely on the fact 
that a person is the operator with control of the 
vehicle, exists at common law or under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act,“ said the 
Court of Appeal. “To give effect to such a premise 
would constitute an impermissible transfer of the 
Crown’s burden of proof to the accused. While the 
fact that a person is the operator with control of the 
vehicle, together with other evidence, may enable a 
trial judge to infer knowledge and control in 
appropriate cases, it cannot, standing  alone, create 
such a rebuttable presumption.” The accused’s PPT 
conviction was set aside. 
Further, because the charge of possessing  the $800 
knowing  that it was obtained from the proceeds of 
crime flowed from the PPT charge, the trial judge 
applied the same sort of rebuttable presumption 
reasoning, concluding  that there was no evidence to 
the contrary indicating  possession of the currency for 
any other purpose. This conviction was also set aside 
as was the conviction for breach of probation, since 
it was founded on the PPT and proceeds of crime 
convictions. The accused’s appeal was allowed, all 
his convictions were set aside and a new trial was 
ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
SUBJECTIVE BELIEF FOR SAMPLE 
SUFFICIENT: OFFICER ‘KNEW’ 
ASD FAIL MEANT OVER .08
R. v. Harrison, 2012 BCCA 339
 
As he followed a vehicle from a bar, 
a police officer observed it negotiate 
a curve in a manner that he felt was 
abnormal. He pulled it over. Before 
exiting  the vehicle on request, the 
driver stuffed her mouth full of potato chips. The 
officer smelled liquor on her breath and noted her 
face was flushed and she had bloodshot eyes. A 
second officer arrived on scene and administered an 
approved screening  device (ASD) test and the 
accused failed. The first officer, with the knowledge 
the accused had failed the ASD test, then read a 
breath demand as follows:
“No rebuttable presumption of knowledge and 
control for purposes of determining 
possession, based solely on the fact that a 
person is the operator with control of the 
vehicle, exists at common law or under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.”
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I have reasonable grounds to believe that you 
are committing, or within the preceding  three 
hours have, as a result of the consumption of 
alcohol, committed an offence under s. 253 of 
the Criminal Code, and I hereby demand that 
you provide, as soon as is practicable, such 
samples of your breath as are necessary to 
enable a proper analysis to be made to 
determine the concentration, if any, of alcohol in 
your blood and to accompany me for the 
purpose of enabling such samples to be taken.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The judge found the officer demanding 
the breath sample had the results of the 
ASD passed onto him. The officer testified 
he “knew” the accused had an alcohol 
level over the .08 limit. In the judge’s view, this was 
sufficient to constitute reasonable and probable 
grounds for a belief that the accused had committed 
an offence under s. 253 of the Criminal Code. The 
breathalyzer demand followed and the accused 
refused to provide a sample. She was convicted.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused argued the police officer 
who made the breath demand did not 
hold the necessary subjective belief that 
an offence was committed under s. 253 
for the purposes of making  a demand under s. 
254(3). The appeal judge agreed. “Nowhere in his 
evidence does [the officer] give the opinion that the 
results of the ASD test constituted reasonable and 
probable grounds for his belief that [the accused] 
had committed an offence contrary to s. 253 of the 
Code,” he said. Therefore, the demand was invalid 
since there was no evidence of the demanding 
officer’s subjective opinion, an essential element of a 
demand. The accused’s conviction was overturned 
and an acquittal was entered. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crown submitted, in its view, 
that there was evidence to support 
the required opinion or subjective 
belief that the accused was 
committing  an offence. The officer knew the accused 
had a blood alcohol level above the legal limit 
because he knew the failed ASD test meant a blood 
alcohol level over .08. Plus, the breath demand 
included the statement that the officer had the 
required belief. The accused, on the other hand, 
submitted that the officer never gave the required 
opinion.
Justice Saunders, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
found the appeal judge erred and “relied heavily 
upon the absence of testimony from the police 
officer (apart from reading  the demand) that he held 
an opinion or belief that an offence had been 
committed.” But he overlooked the officer’s 
testimony that he “knew” an ASD fail meant that the 
individual had consumed alcohol and that it was in 
a concentration over the .08 limit:
Although this police officer was not versed in the 
technical terminology of blood alcohol levels, it 
is apparent the officer considered that [the 
accused] had a blood alcohol concentration 
over that allowed by s.  253(1)(b) – .08 has no 
other significance in the context of alcohol 
related offences. While this evidence would not 
support a finding  of subjective belief for the 
purposes of s.  253(1)(a) [impaired driving], it 
does support such a belief of an offence under 
s. 253(1)(b) [over 80 mg%]. It was open, in my 
view, to the judge to interpret this evidence as 
evidence the officer “knew” the concentration of 
alcohol was greater than permitted by the 
Criminal Code. Rather than use the words 
Examination in chief
Crown: Officer ...  what was your understanding of what a 
 fail meant on an approved screening device?
Officer:   A fail meant to me that the individual who had – 
 that the ASD had detected alcohol present in their 
 system and that it was above – it was over the .08 
 limit, well over, at that point.
Crown: When you say alcohol in her system, do you mean  
 just what part of their system was the alcohol in, 
 your understanding?
Officer:That there’s alcohol present in their – in their – in 
 their body at that point. That was – I knew that they 
 had consumed alcohol and that it was in a 
 concentration greater than 80 milligrams percent, 
 and I knew that – like, now I know that it’s greater 
 than 99 milligrams percent, but at the time, I – I just 
 knew that it was well above.
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“opinion” or “belief”, he used the stronger, more 
certain word, “knew”. In my view, it was open to 
the judge to infer that an officer who “knew” 
that the alcohol concentration “was over the .08 
limit, well over” had a subjective belief that the 
concentration of alcohol was greater than was 
permitted by s.  253(1)(b), thus satisfying that 
aspect of s. 254(3). [para. 14]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal was set aside and the conviction for 
refusing to provide a breath sample was restored.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
REASONABLE GROUNDS LESS 
THAN PRIMA FACIE CASE
R. v. Gunn, 2012 SKCA 80
 
A police officer observed a vehicle 
being  operated in an erratic manner 
late at night when bars were closing. 
It sat at a four-way stop sign with the 
right of way for six to eight seconds 
and seemed to wait for the officer to go first. The 
vehicle made an awkward right hand turn, almost 
went up onto a curb, failed to straighten out 
immediately afterwards and drove for some time 
down the middle of the road. The vehicle appeared 
to be driven without a destination or to avoid the 
officer. It drove onto a side street and then turned 
around and retraced its route. The officer suspected 
the driver might be impaired and stopped the 
vehicle. The accused exhibited physical symptoms of 
alcohol impairment - glassy and bloodshot eyes, 
slurred speech and an odour of liquor on his breath. 
These symptoms confirmed the officer’s suspicion 
such that he felt he had sufficient grounds to 
demand a breathalyzer sample under to s. 254(3) of 
the Criminal Code. The accused was arrested for 
impaired driving  and a breath samples were 
demanded. When walking  to the patrol car the 
officer noticed that the accused’s movements were 
slow and deliberate and he seemed to be 
concentrating  on walking. At the police station he 
provided breath samples that were twice the legal 
limit. He was charged with driving  while impaired, 
driving  while over 80mg% and driving  while 
disqualified.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
At trial the judge found the accused had 
been arbitrarily detained under s. 9 of the 
Charter by the investigating  officer during 
the roadside stop. Although he concluded 
that the officer had reason to be suspicious that the 
accused’s ability to operate a vehicle might be 
impaired by alcohol, the officer lacked the objective 
basis to elevate that suspicion to the level of 
reasonable grounds for belief. In his view, the officer 
provided no evidence of post-arrest signs of 
impairment, failed to conduct roadside investigative 
tests and found alternate inferences or explanations 
other than impairment for the accused’s behaviour. 
So even though the officer honestly believed the 
accused was impaired, the belief was not objectively 
sustainable. The Certificate of Analyses was 
excluded as evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter 
and the accused was acquitted of impaired driving 
and over 80mg%. However, he was convicted of 
driving  while disqualified and given a one year 
driving suspension. 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown appealed, arguing  there was 
no arbitrary detention. But the appeal 
judge upheld the trial judge’s ruling. He 
too found the officer had only a 
reasonable suspicion the accused had alcohol in his 
body but that the factual basis was not strong 
enough to support the officer having  reasonable and 
probable grounds to make a breath demand. The 
accused’s acquittal was upheld.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown again challenged the 
lower courts’ rulings. The Crown 
alleged that the appeal judge erred 
in assessing  the reasonableness of 
the investigating  officer's belief that the accused was 
impaired. In starting  the Court’s analysis, Justice 
Caldwell, delivering  the unanimous judgment, first 
examined the legal standard of “reasonable grounds 
to believe”:
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A police officer may not demand a breath 
sample of an individual unless the officer has 
"reasonable grounds to believe" the individual 
has, within the preceding three hours, driven 
while impaired or while over the proscribed 
limit. This means the officer must subjectively (or 
honestly) believe the individual has driven while 
impaired or "over .08" within the preceding 
three hours and that belief must be rationally 
sustainable on an objective basis. This does not 
mean that the Crown has to demonstrate a prima 
facie case for conviction, let alone prove its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the standard 
of "reasonable grounds to believe" 
is one of lesser probability which 
simply requires the reviewing 
court to determine whether the 
factors articulated by the officer 
who made the breath-demand 
were reliable and were capable of 
supporting  the officer's belief that 
the individual had driven while 
impaired or "over .08" within the 
preceding three hours. 
 
Where an individual challenges 
the validity of a breath-demand 
on the basis that the police officer's belief was 
not reasonable, the question for the trial judge is 
whether, on the whole of the evidence adduced, 
a reasonable person standing  in the shoes of the 
officer would have believed the individual's 
ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired. 
This is a question of law and a trial judge's 
answer to it is measured on appeal against the 
yardstick of correctness.
 
When determining whether the standard of 
"reasonable grounds to believe" has been met, it 
is important to keep in mind that a police officer 
need only believe an individual's ability to drive 
is slightly impaired. ... [F]or the purposes of s. 
253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, an impaired 
ability to operate a vehicle may be established 
where the Crown proves any degree of 
impairment from slight to great. As such, the 
precondition to an officer's authority to make a 
breath-demand may be satisfied where, 
objectively speaking, an officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe an individual's ability to drive 
is even slightly impaired by the consumption of 
alcohol.
 
Given the standard to be met, any inference 
useful to a police officer when attempting  to 
satisfy it must logically tend to support either (a) 
a belief that the individual has driven within the 
preceding  three hours, or (b) a belief that the 
individual's ability to operate a vehicle is 
impaired or that the individual is "over .08". The 
fact an individual has operated a motor vehicle 
is, usually, readily established on the evidence 
without recourse to inferences of fact. However, 
an impairment assessment necessarily calls for 
the officer to draw one or more inferences from 
his or her own observations and the surrounding 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . W h e r e t h e 
reasonableness of the officer's 
belief is challenged in court, the 
officer must be in a position to 
clear ly ar t iculate suf f ic ient 
observations and to point to other 
evidence which would rationally 
and reliably sustain the officer's 
belief of impairment on an 
object ive basis . [ references 
omitted, para. 7-10]
 
And further:
In a voir di re held to determine the 
reasonableness of the police officer's belief, the 
tr ial court must consider whether the 
observations and circumstances articulated by 
the officer are rationally capable of supporting 
the inference of impairment which was drawn 
by the officer; however, the Crown does not 
have to prove the inferences drawn were true or 
even accurate. In other words, the factors 
articulated by the arresting officer need not 
prove the accused was actually impaired. This is 
so because that is the standard of proof reserved 
for a trial on the merits (i.e., proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt). [para. 15]
 
In this case, Justice Caldwell found the Crown had 
been held to proving  an overly onerous standard 
beyond “reasonable grounds to believe” to one of 
proving  a prima facie case or possibly even beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
Post-Arrest Signs of Impairment
 
The Court of Appeal rejected the notion that post-
arrest signs of impairment are required in assessing 
“When determining whether 
the standard of "reasonable 
grounds to believe" has been 
met, it is important to keep in  
mind that a police officer 
need only believe an 
individual's ability to drive is 
slightly impaired.”
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the objective reasonableness of an officer’s belief. 
“The assessment of the reasonableness of this belief 
must be centred around the factors which actually 
led the officer to conclude there were reasonable 
grounds to believe [the accused’s] ability to operate 
a vehicle was impaired thereby satisfying  the 
standard imposed under s. 254(3) of the Criminal 
Code,” said Justice Caldwell. “Therefore, albeit that 
the initial evidentiary burden is on the accused [to 
prove a Charter violation], the Crown must, of 
necessity, adduce evidence tending  to substantiate 
the reasonableness of its officer's belief.” He 
continued:
[W]hile it would be helpful, the Crown is under 
no legal obligation to proffer evidence to 
establish that the arresting officer has continued 
to observe signs of impairment after he or she 
has formed the subjective belief that the s. 
254(3) standard had been met (i.e., presumably, 
prior to the time the officer 
arrested the accused or made the 
demand). Axiomatically then, the 
fact the Crown has not adduced 
post-arrest or demand evidence of 
impairment from the arresting 
o f f i ce r doe s no t s e r ve t o 
undermine the reliability of the 
officer's pre-arrest or demand 
belief. While evidence of the 
existence or lack of post-arrest or 
demand signs of impairment may 
certainly assist in the assessment 
of the reliability of the officer's 
belief, the absence of evidence 
can be of no assistance.” 
Roadside Investigative Tests
The Court of Appeal also found that 
sobriety tests or roadside screening  tests are not a 
requirement to reasonable grounds. While it would 
have been prudent for the investigating  officer to 
have conducted roadside sobriety and alcohol 
screening device tests they are not a necessity:
A roadside screening test may be conducted on 
the standard of "reasonable suspicion". If a "fail" 
results from the use of a roadside screening 
device, the officer may use that information 
when forming  a belief that the individual's 
ability to operate a vehicle is impaired by 
alcohol for the purposes of arrest or a breath 
demand. The evidence of a "fail" result is also 
strong objective evidence which will assist the 
court in its after-the-fact assessment of the 
reliability of the officer's belief. However, if the 
officer already believes he or she has 
objectively-sustainable grounds to arrest or to 
make a breath-demand, then the conduct of a 
roadside screening  device test, while prudent 
and easily-arranged, is not strictly necessary. The 
same can be said for sobriety tests. What I mean 
to say here is that while each type of roadside-
test will certainly permit the arresting officer and 
the courts to better ascertain the objective 
reasonableness of the officer's subjective belief, 
it cannot be said that the conduct of any such 
test is intrinsic to an objectively reasonable 
belief of impairment. This is so because the 
Crown can and has often successfully met an 
accused's challenge (it certainly did so before 
the advent of roadside screening  devices) 
through sufficiently compelling 
evidence of the arresting officer's 
observations and the surrounding 
circumstances which objectively 
supports the reasonableness of 
the officer's belief. Accordingly, 
by holding  the Crown to either 
proffer evidence of the results of 
roadside investigatory tests or to 
satisfactorily explain why it has 
not done so, a court mistakenly 
elevates the evidentiary and 
persuasive burden imposed on 
the Crown and, thereby, holds the 
Crown to establish its case on 
m o r e t h a n a s t a n d a r d o f 
reasonable grounds to believe. 
[para. 21]
 
Inferences & Alternate Explanations
While there may well have been rational alternative, 
innocent or innocuous explanations for each of the 
observations which led the officer to draw the 
negative inference that the accused’s ability to 
operate a vehicle was impaired by alcohol, this did 
not render the officer's inferences that objectively 
supported his belief unreliable. “The standard of 
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ does not require that 
the arresting  officer be in the position to dispel 
“A roadside screening test 
may be conducted on the 
standard of "reasonable 
suspicion". If a "fail" results 
from the use of a roadside 
screening device, the officer 
may use that information 
when forming a belief that the 
individual's ability to operate 
a vehicle is impaired by 
alcohol for the purposes of 
arrest or a breath demand.
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innocent or innocuous inferences which might also 
be reasonably drawn from his or her observations,” 
said Justice Caldwell. But he also cautioned:
This is not to say that the availability of other 
rational inferences is irrelevant; rather, the fact 
innocent or innocuous inferences may be 
rationally drawn from the circumstances may, 
depending  on the soundness or cogency of those 
inferences, serve either to undermine or to 
reinforce the reliability of the inference of 
impairment drawn by the officer; but this 
requires factual determinations to underpin the 
inferences, a judicial assessment of the reliability 
of the inferences drawn and then the weighing 
of conflicting inferences in context and against 
the soundness and cogency of the officer's 
inference of impairment, which did not occur 
here. [para. 23]
 
In conclusion, the lower courts misapprehended the 
burden of proof imposed on the Crown and the legal 
standard of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’. 
However, the Court of Appeal could not determine 
whether the investigating  officer had or did not have 
grounds to make the breath demand. Thus, the 
Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s acquittal 
was set aside and a new trial was ordered. The issue 
of whether reasonable grounds existed was left to a 
new trial judge after rehearing the evidence.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DETAINEE MUST EXPRESS 
DESIRE TO SPEAK WITH LAWYER 
R. v. Fuller & White, 2012 ONCA 565
Following  a joint forces operation 
dubbed “Project Ulverston” police 
believed that four suspected drug 
dealers were living  at a two story 
residence. Police obtained a search 
warrant for the suspects’ residence to be executed in 
the middle of the night. One of the four bedrooms 
on the main floor belonged to the accused Fuller 
and a bedroom in the basement belonged to the 
accused White. But neither of these two men were 
any of the four targeted suspects. Four police officers 
executed the warrant at about 3:40 am while the 
men were sleeping. On entering  the house, the lead 
investigator smelled a strong  odour of marijuana and 
saw a bong  on the kitchen table. Four occupants, 
including  Fuller, were detained in the living  room of 
the main floor for conspiracy to possess marijuana 
for the purpose of trafficking. They were advised of 
their right to counsel and cautioned about making 
statements.  Each indicated they understood and 
declined to call a lawyer at that time. White was 
found in his basement bedroom and was advised of 
his right to counsel and told he had the right to say 
nothing. He was also cautioned about making  a 
statement and answered “not now” when asked if he 
wished to call a lawyer. 
White told police there was “just some weed and 
mushrooms in the closet”, but police found a small 
safe in it. White said Fuller had the key to the safe. 
When asked for the key, Fuller initially denied 
knowing  where it was but eventually produced a set 
of keys from a desk drawer in his bedroom. Fuller 
said the safe belonged to both him and White, and 
told the officer there was “a bit of weed inside.” 
Police also found another key to the safe on a set of 
White’s keys police located in his bedroom. When 
the safe was opened police found baggies, 
packaging  materials, a digital scale, $80, bags 
containing  440.92 grams of marijuana, a bag 
containing  207.9 grams of psilocybin and a film 
canister containing  9.6 grams of cannabis resin. The 
men were arrested, taken to the police station, re-
read their rights and offered an opportunity to 
contact counsel. They were charged with possession 
and possession for the purpose of trafficking.
Ontario Court of Justice
The trial judge found the police told the 
accuseds about their right to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay and of the 
existence and availability of legal aid and 
duty counsel - thereby complying  with the 
informational obligation under s. 10(b) of the 
Charter - but breached the implementational 
component. The judge then went on to exclude the 
accuseds’ statements admitting  they had marihuana 
and magic mushrooms stashed in the safe under s. 
24(2). They were acquitted. 
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Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown challenged the trial 
judge’s ruling  contending  that he 
e r r e d i n f i n d i n g  t h a t t h e 
implementation component of the 
s. 10(b) right had been breached. 
Justice Laskin, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
agreed. “The guarantee of the right to counsel in s. 
10(b) of the Charter imposes three obligations on the 
police – the first is informational and the second and 
third are implementational,” he said. “The police’s 
implementational obligations arise only when 
detainees express a wish to exercise their right to 
counsel.” Thus, the police must first inform a 
detainee of their right to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay and of the existence and availability of 
legal aid and duty counsel. Then, if the detainee 
indicates a desire to exercise this right, the police 
must (1) provide them with a reasonable opportunity 
to do so (except in urgent and dangerous 
circumstances) and (2) refrain from eliciting 
evidence from the detainee until they have had a 
reasonable opportunity (except in cases of urgency 
or danger). 
In this case, the police met their informational 
obligation - they told the men about their right to 
counsel. The implementational obligations, however, 
are only triggered when a detainee indicates a desire 
to exercise the right to counsel.  But there was no 
evidence from any witness that either accused Fuller 
or White asked for a lawyer or indicated a desire to 
speak to one.  The trial judge erred in finding  a 
breach of s. 10(b) and his ruling  excluding  the 
statements could not stand. The Crown’s appeal was 
allowed, the accused’s acquittals were set aside and 
a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
“Don't judge each day by the harvest you reap but 
by the seeds that you plant.” - Robert Louis 
Stevenson 
KNOCK & ANNOUNCE & BREAK-
IN-THE-DOOR-IF-NO-ANSWER 
RULE
R. v. Pan & Ban, 2012 ONCA 581
Police obtained a search warrant for 
a house where they believed there 
w a s a m a r i j u a n a g r o w 
operation.  They went to the house, 
knocked repeatedly and announced 
that they were the police with a warrant.  No one 
answered and, after waiting  30 to 40 seconds, the 
police rammed open the door with a bettering  ram 
and entered the house.  Inside they found 1,370 
marijuana plants and arrested two people inside, 
including  the accuseds Ban and Pan.  Both were 
charged with production of marijuana, possession 
for the purpose of trafficking  in marijuana and theft 
of electricity.  
Ontario Court of Justice.
The judge stayed the charges against Ban, 
in part, on the ground that the police had 
breached the knock-and-announce 
rule. As for the search, the judge found it 
was not conducted reasonably under s. 8 of the 
Charter. In his view, the police conducted a 
“dynamic entry” without any grounds to do so. “The 
failure of someone to answer the door within 60 
seconds, when one expects fans to be running  is not 
an exigency that justifies a dynamic entry,” he said. 
“The knock-and-announce rule is not a knock-and-
break-in-the-door-if-no-answer rule.  It means that 
non-violent execution of the warrant must be 
attempted.” 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown argued that the trial 
judge erred in holding  that the 
police did not comply with the 
knock-and-announce rule.  Justice 
“The police’s implementational obligations arise only when detainees express a wish to exercise 
their right to counsel.”
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Laskin, authoring  the Court of Appeal’s judgment, 
agreed:
Unless exigent circumstances exist, the police 
must knock and announce their presence before 
entering a home. The knock-and-announce rule 
has been part of our law for over 400 years. ...
The rationales for the rule are well known: the 
protection of the dignity and privacy interests of 
the occupants o f the house, and the 
enhancement of the safety of the police and the 
public. [paras. 35-36]
So although there were no exigent circumstances 
that would justify a departure from knocking-and-
announcing, the police 
nonetheless did comply 
with the rule. They gave 
notice of presence (they 
knocked several times), 
notice of authority (they 
announced who they 
were) and notice of 
purpose (they stated 
their reason for being  there – to execute a search 
warrant).  Justice Laskin concluded that the knock-
and-announce rule is a knock-and-break-in-the-
door-if-no-answer rule.  “If the police receive no 
answer, they are entitled to force entry into a home,” 
he said. Since the police did not depart from the 
knock-and-announce rule and complied with its 
three components, the judge erred in holding  that 
the Crown was required to justify why police 
departed from it.
However, the knock-and-announce rule also 
requires the police to give the occupants of a home 
a reasonable amount of time to answer. The police 
must properly implement the knock-and-announce 
rule by waiting  long  enough before forcing  entry. In 
this case, the Court of Appeal would let a judge at a 
new trial decide whether the 30 to 40 seconds the 
police waited was a reasonable amount of time 
before entering. 
Justice Laskin also opined that “even if [police] did 
depart from the knock-and-announce rule – by, for 
example, not waiting  long  enough before forcing 
entry into the home – that departure would hardly 
be so egregious that it would 
turn this case into one of those 
exceptional cases requiring  a 
stay.” Since the trial judge erred 
in principle and exercised his 
discretion unreasonably in 
staying  the charges, Ban’s stay 
was set aside and a new trial was 
ordered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LIMITATION ON RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL STILL APPLIES TO ASD 
DEMANDS DESPITE CHANGES
R. v. Jaycox, 2012 BCCA 365
The accused drove up to and through 
a p o l i c e r o a d b l o ck w i t h o u t 
stopping. She was pursued for a short 
time and pulled over. A strong  smell 
of alcohol was detected and signs of 
impairment were noted. Two approved screening 
device  (ASD) demands were made but the accused 
refused to provide a breath sample on both 
occasions, even though the jeopardy she would face 
if she failed to comply was explained to her.  The 
accused was then detained for refusing  to comply 
with an ASD demand and impaired driving, and was 
informed of her Charter rights. She asked to speak to 
counsel and did so when she was taken to the police 
detachment.  After obtaining  legal advice, the 
Knock-and-Announce Rule
Except in exigent circumstances, the police must 
knock-and-announce their presence before 
entering a dwelling house. In doing so, the police 
must give:
1. NOTICE OF PRESENCE by knocking or 
ringing the door bell;
2. NOTICE OF AUTHORITY by identifying 
themselves as law enforcement officers; and
3. NOTICE OF PURPOSE by stating a lawful 
reason for entry.
“Unless exigent circumstances exist, the 
police must knock and announce their 
presence before entering a home. The 
knock-and-announce rule has been part 
of our law for over 400 years.”
+ wait a reasonable amount of 
time to give occupants time to 
answer before entering.
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accused advised the police that she had been 
mistaken and now wanted to provide a breath 
sample.  She was told it was too late to do so and 
was charged with impaired driving  and failing  to 
comply with an ASD demand.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The judge acquitted the accused on the 
impaired driving  charge because the 
evidence was insufficient. As for the 
failure to comply with the ASD demand, 
the jude ruled the demand was unconstitutional. 
Prior to the July 2, 2008  amendment to the ASD 
demand provision, an officer could only make an 
ASD demand in circumstances where the officer 
reasonably suspected a person had alcohol in their 
body at the time of the demand and they also had 
alcohol in their body at the time of driving. An 
immediate temporal connection to the suspicion and 
the driving  was required. Now, however, the ASD 
demand provision authorizes a demand where the 
officer reasonably suspects that a person has alcohol 
or a drug  in their body and has operated a motor 
vehicle within the previous three hours. There is no 
requirement for the officer to also suspect the person 
had alcohol in their body at the time of driving. The 
judge found the new wording  “allows a search or 
seizure in circumstances where there is no reason to 
think that the results will provide evidence that an 
offence had been committed.” He then read an 
amendment into s . 254(2) to remedy i ts 
constitutional flaw. In this case there were no 
reasonable grounds to suspect an offence had 
occurred. The demand was unlawful, contrary to s. 8 
of the Charter and could not be saved under s. 1. 
The judge also found that a person required to 
provide a breath sample for an ASD analysis is 
detained and has the right to counsel under s. 10(b), 
which could not be limited under s. 1. This was 
different than case law under the previous legislation 
where the limitation on the right to counsel had 
been found to be justified because of the policy 
behind the demand and the practical need to obtain 
a breath sample quickly. “The legislative objective of 
s. 254(2) is now outweighed by the abridgement of 
s. 10(b) rights, given that a refusal to provide a 
breath sample, in the circumstances set out in the 
new punishment sections of 255 (2.2) and (3.2), can 
result in respective punishments of up to 10 years, 
and life, imprisonment,” said the judge. Since the 
ASD demands the accused had refused were 
unlawful when they were made, her refusal to 
comply with them was not unlawful. The accused’s 
refusal was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter 
for the s. 10(b) breach and she was acquitted.
British Columbia Supreme Court 
A Crown appeal was successful. The 
appeal judge found the trial judge had 
jurisdiction to read in an amendment to 
remedy the constitutional flaw in s. 
254(2) but that he erred in failing  to apply s. 254(2), 
as judic ia l ly amended, to the accused’s 
circumstances. The trial judge also erred in 
concluding  that the demand was unlawful and that 
the refusal was not. Plus, he mistakenly found the 
accused’s s. 10 (b) right to counsel was violated and 
also erred in excluding  evidence of her refusal under 
to s. 24(2). The accused’s acquittal was set aside and 
a guilty verdict was entered. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed, contending 
tha t the 2008  amendments 
significantly overhauled the ASD 
demand provisions such that the 
implicit suspension of the s. 10(b) Charter right 
formerly recognized no longer applied to the current 
wording  of s. 254(2). She also submitted that the 
advent of a 24-hour duty counsel system and the 
ubiquity of cellular telephones have altered the 
landscape addressing  the concern regarding  changes 
to blood alcohol that might occur during  a lengthy 
delay in contacting  counsel. In her view, the earlier 
justification for suspending  the right to counsel 
resulted from the roadside screening  test being 
administered forthwith at the place where the 
motorist was stopped and the prompt testing  was 
necessary having  regard to the overall two hour time 
limit, if the scheme was to work. But now, with the 
new amendments, the subject of the demand can be 
anyone reasonably suspected of driving  or operating 
a vehicle (including  those who did not actually drive 
or operate a vehicle) within the preceding  three 
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hours. Further, although the testing  must still be 
forthwith, the time and place of the demand can 
now be within three hours of the suspected driving 
at any location where the suspected driver or 
operator is located and there need no longer be a 
logical connection between the time of the demand 
and any overall two hour time limit.
Justice Hinkson, however, found the advent of 24-
hour duty counsel, the widespread access to cellular 
telephones, nor any of the differences pointed out by 
the accused did not change the applicability of a 
limitation on the right to counsel following  the 2008 
amendments. Nor is a temporal link between the 
consumption of alcohol and the alleged driving 
required:
I do not accept [the accused’s] contention that 
the Thomsen suspension of the right to counsel 
“forthwith” depends upon a temporal link 
between the consumption of alcohol and the 
alleged driving, nor to the two or three hour time 
limits applicable to evidentiary breath demands 
and blood alcohol presumptions. Rather, the 
right to counsel is suspended under Thomsen 
and its progeny ... because of the brevity of the 
detention and the obligation of the detainee to 
provide a sample “forthwith”. The requirement 
that a breath sample be provided “forthwith” is, 
from a pragmatic point of view, incompatible 
with the exercise of a right to counsel before 
responding  to the demand, particularly if the 
testing  is to interfere as little as possible with the 
flow of traffic, of both drivers subjected to 
demands, and of other vehicles using the roads.
Moreover, ... the two and now three hour limits 
relate to the presumptions upon which the 
Crown may rely in s. 258  of the Code, but not to 
the admissibility of the breath sample evidence, 
and in the result, I conclude that the change 
from a two to a three hour limit does not affect 
the applicability of the Thomsen suspension of 
the right to counsel. [paras. 45-46]
The Court of Appeal also ruled that the implied 
limitation of the right to counsel under s. 254(2) 
(ASD demand) was not inconsistent with the lack of 
such an implied limitation under s. 254(3) (breath 
demand) where there is an entitlement to advice as 
to the right of counsel and the exercise of that right. 
ASD demand prior to July 2, 2008:
s. 254(2) Where a peace officer reasonably suspects that a 
person who is operating a motor vehicle or vessel or 
operating or assisting in the operation of an aircraft or of 
railway equipment or who has the care or control of a 
motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft or of railway equipment, 
whether it is in motion or not, has alcohol in the person’s 
body, the peace officer may, by demand made to that 
person, require the person to provide forthwith such a 
sample of breath as in the opinion of the peace officer is 
necessary to enable a proper analysis of the breath to be 
made by means of an approved screening device and, 
where necessary, to accompany the peace officer for the 
purpose of enabling such a sample of breath to be taken.
ASD demand as amended on July 2, 2008:
s. 254(2) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a person has alcohol or a drug in their body 
and that the person has, within the preceding three hours, 
operated a motor vehicle or vessel, operated or assisted in 
the operation of an aircraft or railway equipment or had 
the care or control of a motor vehicle, a vessel, an aircraft 
or railway equipment, whether it was in motion or not, the 
peace officer may, by demand, require the person to 
comply with paragraph (a), in the case of a drug, or with 
either or both of paragraphs (a) and (b), in the case of 
alcohol:
(a) to perform forthwith physical coordination tests 
prescribed by regulation to enable the peace officer to 
determine whether a demand may be made under 
subsection (3) or (3.1) and, if necessary, to accompany the 
peace officer for that purpose; and
(b) to provide forthwith a sample of breath that, in the 
peace officer’s opinion, will enable a proper analysis to be 
made by means of an approved screening device and, if 
necessary, to accompany the peace officer for that 
purpose.
ASD demand as amended by judge:
s. 254(2) "If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a person has alcohol or a drug in their body 
and that the person has, within the preceding three hours, 
operated a motor vehicle or vessel, operated or assisted in 
the operation of an aircraft or railway equipment or had 
the care or control of a motor vehicle, a vessel, an aircraft 
or railway equipment, whether it was in motion or not, 
with alcohol or a drug in their body, the peace officer may, by 
demand, require the person to comply with paragraph (a), 
in the case of a drug, or with either or both of paragraphs 
(a) and (b), in the case of alcohol: ..."
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Further, the creation of new offences and the 
increase in the potential penalties for refusals to 
provide breath samples did not warrant a departure 
from the limitation of the right to counsel. These 
changes did not alter the “forthwith” requirement 
that is the foundation for the limitation of the right to 
counsel for an ASD demand. The need for testing 
remains immediate and investigative in nature. Since 
the implicit suspension of the s. 10(b) Charter right 
applied to the current wording  of s. 254(2) as 
amended by the trial judge, the accused’s appeal 
was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
RISK OF DANGER NEED NOT 
RISE TO LEVEL OF PROBABILITY 
IN CARE OR CONTROL CASES
R. v. Smits, 2012 ONCA 524
A nearby resident found the accused 
passed out in the back of a van 
parked on the side of a narrow 
country road in the morning  hours 
and called police. Police arrived and 
located the van. It was not running, but its hood was 
warm to the touch. The officers looked into the van 
and saw the accused passed out on the rear seat. An 
officer entered the van through the unlocked driver’s 
side door after knocking  but receiving  no 
response. He saw a cell phone flipped open on the 
driver’s seat and the keys were in the ignition. After 
several attempts to rouse the accused by calling  out 
to him, he awoke.  He looked disoriented, was 
directed to exit the van and stumbled as he got 
out.  He appeared “haggard” and his eyes were 
bloodshot and glassy, his breath smelled of alcohol 
and he swayed.  He had scabbed cuts around his 
right eye and on his nose, and his jeans were 
torn.  Describing  him as “obviously intoxicated”, 
police arrested him for impaired care or control of a 
motor vehicle.
 
In the van police saw a glass of orange juice in the 
centre cup-holder, a partially empty unsealed bottle 
of vodka between the two front seats, an open can of 
Budweiser on the floor in the rear passenger area, an 
empty Budweiser can underneath the driver’s seat 
and a red duffle bag  on the floor with another can of 
beer on top of it.   The van had an opening  between 
the back seat and the front seats where a middle seat 
may have been removed and a person could move 
up to the driver’s seat from the back seat area with 
no obstruction. When the tow truck arrived to 
remove the van, the accused asked the officers to 
take his cell phone out of it. When they did, it was 
noted that the phone’s battery was almost dead. The 
tow truck driver was able to start the van with one 
turn of the key and drove it off the grass onto the 
roadway without any difficulty.  The van had an 
automatic transmission. The accused was taken to 
the police station and provided two breath samples, 
registering  147mg% and 138mg%.   He also denied 
driving  the van, instead admitting  to sitting  in the 
driver’s seat just before he passed out.  He said that a 
friend had driven him to where the van was parked, 
but the friend had left. He would not provide his 
friend’s name to the police nor would he say who 
own the van.  He insisted that he was just a 
passenger passed out in the van.
 
Ontario Court of Justice
 
At trial the accused conceded he was 
impaired but argued there was no 
evidence of a risk that he would have set 
the vehicle in motion. The trial judge 
disagreed, finding  the accused was in care or control 
because he may have changed his mind and decided 
to drive while still impaired. Plus, she held that even 
if the accused had been trying  to wait out the 
impairment, just “because he was difficult to rouse 
does not support an inference that he would have 
remained passed out until he had achieved a state of 
sobriety and thus not pose a risk to set the motor 
vehicle in motion while impaired”.  In her view, 
there was a concrete and tangible likelihood the 
accused would have woken up and decided he was 
going  to move the van while he was still impaired.  
The accused was convicted of care or control while 
impaired and sentenced to four months in jail 
followed by two years probation and a three year 
driving  prohibition. He had also pled guilty to 
breaching his probation by consuming alcohol. 
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Ontario Superior Court of Justice
 
The accused argued the trial 
judge erred in finding  that he 
was in care or control of his 
motor vehicle. He submitted 
an individual found asleep in the back 
seat of a vehicle does not create the 
public risk that s. 253(1) was designed to 
prevent and there was no more than a 
mere possibility that he would have 
changed his mind and endangered 
society by choosing  to drive while 
impaired.  The appeal judge overturned 
the conviction and found the Crown 
failed to prove that the accused had been 
in care or control of his vehicle.  In his 
view, the trial judge’s decision was based 
on speculation that the accused would 
still be impaired when he awoke and decided to 
drive.
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
 
Th e C r o w n t h e n a p p e a l e d 
suggesting  the Superior Court judge 
erred in applying  the correct 
standard of review and substituted 
his own opinion for that of the trial judge’s in 
deciding  whether the accused had care or control of 
the motor vehicle. Justice Brown, delivering  the 
Court of Appeal’s opinion, first reviewed the law 
regarding care or control: 
 
The Crown can establish care or control of a 
motor vehicle in a variety of ways. The first is by 
relying on the statutory presumption found in s. 
258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.  Where an 
accused is found in the driver’s seat, the accused 
must establish on a balance of probabilities that 
he or she did not occupy the driver’s seat for the 
purpose of setting the vehicle in motion. 
 
Where the statutory presumption is rebutted or is 
not available on the evidence, as in this case, 
the Crown can rely on what is commonly 
referred to as de facto or actual care or control. 
 
The mens rea for having  the care or control of a 
motor vehicle is the intent to assume care or 
control af ter the voluntary 
consumption of alcohol or a drug.  
The actus reus is the act of 
assumption of care or control 
when the voluntary assumption of 
alcohol or a drug has impaired 
the ability to drive. [paras. 47-49]
 
In this case, the actus reus of the 
offence of care or control was at 
issue. As was noted in a previous 
decision (R. v. Wren (2000), 144 
C.C.C. (3d) 374 (Ont.C.A.)), “in 
order to establish care or control of 
a motor vehicle, the act or conduct 
of the accused in relation to that 
motor vehicle must be such that 
there is created a risk of danger, 
whether from putting  the car in 
motion or in some other way.” 
Proof of a risk of danger is a necessary ingredient to 
establish the actus reus of care or control and three 
risks of danger have been identified in the cases 
where an intoxicated individual uses a motor vehicle 
for a non-driving purpose:
 
1. The risk that the vehicle will unintentionally 
be set in motion;
2. The risk that through negligence a stationary 
or inoperable vehicle may endanger the 
individual or others; or
3. The risk that the individual who has decided 
not to drive will change his or her mind and 
drive while still impaired.
 
It was the third risk of danger - the “change of mind” 
ground for care or control - that applied to this case. 
Justice Brown noted:
 
In order to find care or control based on the 
change of mind ground, the Crown must prove 
there was risk that the [accused] would have 
decided to drive while still impaired.  The risk 
does not have to rise to the level of 
probability.  ...
 
That being said, what risk of danger must exist to 
establish actual care or control based on the 
change of mind ground has been the subject of 
much debate.  The topic has generated 
“The Crown can 
establish care or control 
of a motor vehicle in a 
variety of ways. Where 
the statutory 
presumption is rebutted 
or is not available on the 
evidence, as in this 
case, the Crown can 
rely on what is 
commonly referred to as 
de facto or actual care 
or control.
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considerable judicial attention in the courts 
below.  ... [paras. 56-57].   
 
And further:
Although the courts below have applied different 
modifiers, what all the authorities, including this 
court, seem to be saying  is that in order to 
establish that an accused has created a risk of 
danger in change of mind cases, the Crown must 
demonstrate a risk that an accused, while 
impaired, would change his or her mind and put 
the vehicle in motion.  That risk must be based 
on more than speculation or conjecture. Saying 
that any person whose ability to operate a motor 
vehicle is impaired to any degree might change 
his or her mind is not sufficient. The trier of fact 
must examine the facts and determine if there is 
an evidentiary foundation that such risk of 
danger exists.  
 
I appreciate that this task is not without its 
challenges because a finding of whether a risk of 
danger arises in circumstances where an 
accused is not actually driving  requires the trial 
judge to engage in an assessment of what in all 
the particular circumstances may occur in the 
not too distant future. However, that is all part of 
the fact-finding process for the trier of fact.  
 
Whether a risk of danger arises on the facts is 
determined by assessing  circumstantial 
evidence.  [paras. 60-62]
Relying  on an earlier case (R. v. Szymanski, 2009 
CanLII 45328 (ON SC)), the Court of Appeal cited a 
list of factors a court might look at when engaging  in 
the risk of danger analysis on the basis of 
circumstantial evidence:
 
• The level of impairment, which is relevant to 
the likelihood of exercising  bad judgment and 
the time it would take for the accused to 
become fit to drive;
• Whether the keys were in the ignition or readily 
available to be placed in the ignition;
• Whether the vehicle was running;
• The location of the vehicle;
• Whether the accused had reached his or her 
destination or if the accused was still required 
to travel to his or her destination;
• The accused’s disposition and attitude;
• Whether the accused drove the vehicle to the 
location where it was found;
• Whether the accused started driving  after 
drinking  and pulled over to “sleep it off” or 
started using  the vehicle for purposes other 
than driving;
• Whether the accused had a plan to get home 
that did not involve driving  while impaired or 
over the legal limit;
• Whether the accused had a stated intention to 
resume driving;
• Whether the accused was seated in the driver’s 
seat regardless of the applicability of the 
presumption;
• Whether the accused was wearing  his or her 
seatbelt;
• Whether the accused failed to take advantage 
of alternate means of leaving the scene;
• Whether the accused had a cell phone with 
which to make other arrangements and failed to 
do so.
 
Did the accused’s conduct in relation to the motor 
vehicle create a risk that he, while impaired, would 
put the vehicle in motion and thereby create a 
danger? The Court of Appeal found that it was open 
to the trial judge to conclude that it was so: 
In this case, there was ample circumstantial 
evidence to support the trial judge’s conclusion 
that the [accused] was in care or control of the 
van. Her finding that the [accused] would have 
decided to drive while still impaired was 
supported by the following:
·  The presence of the keys in the ignition and 
ease with which the van could be put into 
motion;
“[I]n order to establish that an accused has created a risk of danger in change of mind cases, 
the Crown must demonstrate a risk that an accused, while impaired, would change his or her 
mind and put the vehicle in motion.”
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· The [accused’s] intention to return to his home 
in Barrie;
· The van’s remote location, the lack of available 
public transportation, and the [accused’s] lack of 
any alternate plan to get home;
· The degree of the [accused’s] intoxication, 
which was such that his judgment was 
significantly impaired;
· The [accused’s] “volatility in mood and 
response” as evidenced in the DVD, which 
augmented concerns about his judgment;
· The accessibility of the driver’s seat;
· The [accused’s] earlier presence in the driver’s 
seat when he contemplated driving. [para. 71]
 
The appeal judge erred in overturning  the accused’s 
conviction. “The findings of the trial judge were 
based on more than mere speculation,” said Justice 
Brown. “There were a constellation of factors that 
were relied upon by the trial judge, apart from 
simply the breathalyzer readings of the [accused], in 
reaching  her conclusion there was a risk of danger 
sufficient to establish the [accused’s] care or control 
of the motor vehicle.” The Crown’s appeal was 
allowed and the accused’s conviction and sentence 
were restored. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
A NEW SUPREME
On October 5, 2012 the Right Honourable Beverley 
McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, welcomed the 
appointment by Prime Minister Stephen Harper of 
Mr. Justice Richard Wagner to the Supreme Court of 
Canada.  “Justice Wagner is a judge of the highest 
ability, integrity and intellect”, said Chief Justice 
McLachlin.  “In addition to his extensive experience 
on the Bench, he brings a profound expertise in civil 
and commercial litigation. I look forward to the 
contribution of this distinguished jurist to the work 
of the Court.”
 
Justice Wagner, who sat as a judge of the Quebec 
Court of Appeal, was sworn sworn-in as a judge of 
the Supreme Court in a private ceremony on 
October 11, 2012. A formal welcome ceremony will 
take place on December 3, 2012. 
THREAT MUST BE TAKEN 
SERIOUSLY
R. v. Tutino, 2012 QCCA 889
 
Two uniformed patrol officers with 
the Société de Transport de Montréal 
saw a man in his late forties flip a 
subway turnstile with his hand and 
pass through without paying, thereby 
committing  an offence. They both called out to him 
and asked him to return. The accused, furious at 
being  caught, aggressively kicked the metal fixture 
holding  the turnstile. The officers then asked him to 
identify himself but he refused on three occasions. 
He finally complied by giving  his health insurance 
card but told police to “fuck off” when they asked 
for his address, which was required to complete the 
statement of offence under the Code of Penal 
Procedure. He then complied, giving  them a blue 
hospital card. They asked him to state his address, 
but it did not match the one on the card. When 
asked for his correct address the accused responded 
by pushing  the officer on the chest with his right 
hand. Both officers then forcibly took the accused 
face down to the ground and arrested him for 
assault. He was handcuffed and searched for 
dangerous objects. The accused then said “If I see 
your face again, I'm going  to kill you.” He was then 
immediately arrested for uttering  death threats and 
re-read his rights. He replied, “I'm going  to hit your 
face with a baseball bat.” The accused was charged 
with two counts of uttering death threats and assault.
Court of Quebec
The judge concluded that the threats 
directed at the two officers could not 
have been taken seriously given the 
context. “I believe that considering  the 
whole context of the arrest, that a reasonable person 
would not consider that those threats could have 
been serious just by the fact that they were told,” 
said the judge. “The accused was facing  two agents 
wearing  uniforms, who were in a position of 
authority and who were in force concerning  the 
accused.” The accused was acquitted of the uttering 
threats charges. On the assault charge, the judge 
expressed uncertainty as to what actually had 
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happened and whether the accused had in fact 
pushed the officer or not. The accused was also 
acquitted on the assault charge.
Quebec Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the verdicts 
of acquittal entered by the trial 
judge on the two counts of uttering 
death threats and the assault.
Uttering Threats
The Crown argued that the trial judge did not 
properly consider the relevant factors respecting  the 
uttering  death threats charges. But the Court of 
Appeal disagreed. “It is not sufficient for the words 
used to constitute a threat to bring  about a 
conviction,” said the Court. “Rather, the context in 
which the words were uttered, and the impact the 
words would have on the persons 
to whom they were directed, must 
be taken into account in assessing 
whether a criminal offence was 
committed.” So even though there 
was no doubt that the words the 
accused pronounced, if looked at 
in isolation from their context, 
would constitute a death threat or 
a threat to cause bodily harm, 
more was required to engage the 
accused’s criminal liability:
Here, the trial judge did not 
render section 264.1(1)(a) Cr. C. 
inapplicable to suspects who are in the custody 
of police officers simply because the threat 
could not be carried out immediately. Instead, 
she analyzed the facts of the case, and found 
that the [accused] had lost his self-control, 
resenting the way in which he had been treated 
for such a trivial infraction as not paying for his 
subway ticket, and who had uttered the 
impugned words in a state of frustration. 
Moreover, the threats had not been uttered in a 
way that a reasonable person, in the same 
circumstances, would have objectively feared for 
his or life, nor had it been established that the 
[accused] intended the patrol officers to take 
them seriously. [para. 14]
Nor did the trial judge find that the threat had to be 
so serious that it could have been carried out 
immediately. “All the trial judge did was consider 
the general context in which the threats were made, 
namely the fact that the persons to whom the threats 
were directed were officers in a position of authority, 
and that the [accused] was in custody when the 
threats were made,” said the Court of Appeal. “This 
case is no precedent for the view that it is open 
season on uniformed officers to be recipients of 
death threats with impunity.” The accused’s acquittal 
on the threatening counts was affirmed.
Assault 
As for the assault charge, the trial judge did err. 
“There was consistent, uncontradicted evidence as 
to the circumstances that resulted in [the officer] 
being  pushed in the chest,” said the Court. 
“Moreover, i t i s c lea r tha t 
immediately after the assault 
occurred, the [accused] was 
forcibly taken to the ground, 
handcuffed and placed under 
arrest. There is no plausible 
explanation in the evidence that 
suggests any reason other than the 
assault for the two patrol officers to 
have acted in that fashion.” The 
judge gave inadequate reasons for 
holding  that there was a reasonable 
doubt. The accused’s acquittal was 
set aside and a new trial was 
ordered on the assault charge. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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“[T]he threats had not been 
uttered in a way that a 
reasonable person, in the 
same circumstances, would 
have objectively feared for his 
or life, nor had it been 
established that the 
[accused] intended the patrol 
officers to take them 
seriously.”
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DECLARATION OF OVERAGE AS 
CONSISTENT WITH INNOCENCE 
NOT COMMON SENSE
R. v. Ashley, 2012 ONCA 576
The accused arrived at Toronto’s 
Pearson International Airport on a 
flight home from Jamaica. She was 
accompanied by her two and a half 
year old daughter and had several 
pieces of checked luggage. She was routed to a 
secondary inspection after declaring  an overage of 
alcohol and several agricultural products. During  an 
inspection by Canada Border Services officers, two 
of her largest suitcases were found to contain items 
of produce, including  six large compressed balls of 
cocoa wrapped in cellophane. When the cocoa balls 
were cut they were found to contain plastic wrapped 
marihuana weighing  20.2 kg  (44 lbs) in total with a 
value of between $51,175 and $57,850. The 
accused was arrested and charged with importing.  
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
At trial the he Crown alleged that the 
accused was acting  as a drug  courier. The 
accused, on the other hand, provided a 
long  story to explain why she had no 
knowledge of the contents of her luggage. She said 
she had been planning  to take this trip with her 
daughter for some time and argued that her 
declaration of an alcohol overage was indicia of 
innocence. In her view, as a matter of common 
sense, it was unlikely a drug  importer would 
knowingly make a declaration that would send her 
to a secondary inspection. The trial judge flatly 
rejected the accused’s evidence and, in assessing  her 
credibility, took judicial notice that (1) the 
declaration of an alcohol overage is not uncommon 
in cases where drugs are found expertly hidden in a 
traveller’s belonging  in drug  importing  cases at 
Pearson airport and (2) the almost last minute cash 
payment for the ticket was out of the ordinary and 
consistent with what is often seen in drug 
importation cases. The accused was convicted of 
importing  a controlled substance and sentenced to 
18-months imprisonment to be served in the 
community. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused contended that the 
trial judge improperly took judicial 
notice. This argument, however, 
was rejected. As for the declaration 
of the alcohol overage, the trial judge had extensive 
experienced with similar prosecutions for drug-
related offences. The accused’s position that 
declaring  an overage was consistent with innocence 
was not a common sense inference. Plus, the judge 
did not use the accused’s declaration of overage as 
evidence against her. 
As to the last minute cash ticket purchase, it was out 
of the ordinary. The accused said she had planned to 
take this trip with her daughter for some time, but 
common sense would suggest that in those 
circumstances the tickets would have been 
purchased during  the planning  process, not last 
minute and in cash. It was open to the trial judge to 
conclude that this conduct was inconsistent with the 
accused’s story and consistent with what is often 
observed in drug importing cases.  
Moreover, the trial judge’s reliance on judicial notice 
for these two factors did not play a significant role in 
his assessment of the accused’s credibility given the 
abundance of other factors, which were far more 
devastating  to her credibility. The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed and her conviction upheld. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
‘CONVERSATIONAL TOUCHING’ 
NOT OPPRESSIVE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES: 
CONFESSION ADMISSIBLE
R. v. Pappas, 2012 ABCA 221
 
Following  the discovery of a 
deceased male, who had been shot 
once in the back and once in the 
head with a 9 mm handgun, the 
accu sed was p l aced und e r 
surveillance. He was seen throwing  items into a 
garbage can outside a 7–11 store and into a 
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dumpster behind a gas station across the street. 
Police retrieved the victim’s credit card, numerous 
items of apparel stained with the victim’s blood and 
a receipt for a $2,500 cheque made out to the 
accused. The police also ascertained that the 
accused was the registered owner of a 9 mm 
handgun. He was subsequently arrested at an airport 
about to board a plane for London, England. The 
accused was Chartered and cautioned, taken to a 
holding  centre and given the opportunity to phone a 
lawyer. After meeting  with his lawyer for about an 
hour, the accused was moved to a small, 
windowless interrogation room with two chairs and 
a small table where he met with a detective. The 
accused said he did not want to talk without his 
lawyer being  present but, without much prompting, 
went on to give exculpatory evidence. He then again 
said he did not want to answer any more questions 
without his lawyer. Questioning  stopped and after a 
half hour dinner break, the detective changed tactics 
for the interview. 
The detective said he was convinced that the 
accused had executed the victim in the basement of 
the victim’s house. He began to confront the 
accused with the evidence the police had already 
gathered linking  him to the murder. His chair was 
reasonably close to the accused and the detective 
occasionally placed his hand on the accused’s knee 
in what would seem to be a gesture of intimacy and 
understanding. The detective advised the accused 
that the evidence against him was overwhelming 
and exhorted him to tell why someone who was not 
a criminal would have shot the victim, forged one of 
his cheques and stolen his credit card – using  the 
card later to buy three airline tickets to London. 
When this failed to produce a confession, the 
detective became more aggressive. He moved his 
chair closer to the accused and called him greedy. 
He began tapping  the accused on the knee from 
time to time. For the most part, the accused had 
remained mute and invoked his right to silence, 
saying  that on his lawyer’s advice he would not 
answer further questions. The detective said he was 
not asking  questions and continued to talk, 
confronting  the accused with evidence. After a short 
pause the accused began to confess, ultimately 
admitting to shooting the victim.  
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
 
At trial the accused argued, among  other 
things, that his right to silence under s. 7 
of the Charter was breached and, 
therefore, his confession was not 
voluntary. He contended that during  the second half 
of the interview - after the dinner break - the 
detective created an atmosphere of oppression by, 
among  other things, moving  his chair closer to him 
and repeatedly tapping  his thigh. The trial judge 
twice reviewed the video tape of the interview and 
concluded the detective, although persistent, was 
not threatening, hostile or intimidating. The judge 
ruled that the Crown had proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused’s statements and 
confession were voluntary. Thus, there was no 
breach of the accused’s s. 7 right to silence and the 
statements were admissible. A jury found the 
accused guilty of second degree murder.
 
Alberta Court of Appeal 
 
The accused appealed his 
conviction suggesting, among 
other grounds, that the trial 
judge made an error by 
misapprehending  the evidence concerning  the 
physical force applied by police. The accused 
submitted that the physical contact by the police 
was more than mere “body language,” as 
characterized by the trial judge, and consisted of the 
continuous poking  of his leg  during  the aggressive 
phase of the interview, as well as a shake of his body 
when he was looking  away. In his view, the 
detective’s conduct “took on the character of 
assaulting  a detainee” and the physical contact to 
gain his attention during  questioning  interfered with 
his constitutional right to remain silent. The poking 
and touching  were uninvited, nor did he consent to 
either. In his opinion, the constant physical contact 
was designed to make it difficult, if not impossible, 
for him to ignore the questions and to escape the 
relentless onslaught of his interrogator. He 
acknowledged that the detective did not use 
“violent” physical force but a lesser form of physical 
force that constituted a continuous series of assaults 
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upon his person that created oppress ive 
circumstances which, together with the persistent 
and relentless interrogation, broke his will so that he 
was induced to make an involuntary confession. He 
submitted, as well, that his right to remain silent was 
effectively overcome by the physical contact so that 
he could not ignore the questions or otherwise be 
inattentive to them.
Although the physical touching  went beyond mere 
“body language” - the term used by the trial judge to 
describe the contact - a majority of the Alberta Court 
of Appeal concluded that the persistent questioning 
and touching  of the accused’s body by the police 
officer did not overbear his ability to exercise his 
free will and deprive him of a meaningful choice as 
to whether or not to speak to the police:
Here the trial judge heard [the detective’s]’ 
evidence and watched the video of the interview 
twice. She concluded that the confession was 
voluntary, because the conduct of the police did 
not exceed the bounds of reasonable persuasion, 
and that the [accused] had chosen, through the 
exercise of an operating mind, to speak to the 
police. We have also viewed the video. We are 
not persuaded the trial judge erred in her 
assessment of the police conduct and the 
voluntariness of the confession. [The detective] 
did place his hand upon the wrist, knee and 
thigh of the [accused] from time to time during 
the questioning. The touching, for the most part, 
was properly characterized by both defence 
counsel at trial, and by the trial judge, as 
“tapping”, in an apparent effort to concentrate 
the [accused’s] attention, and in some instances 
as a seeming expression of the officer’s concern. 
The [accused] showed no signs of discomfort 
with the touching; he made no attempt to push 
the detective’s hand away, nor did he ask that the 
touching  cease. From an objective standpoint, 
the touching  was not offensive nor intimidating, 
and the [accused] did not give evidence of any 
subjective feelings to the contrary. The touching 
could properly be described as conversational 
touching, which in ordinary human discourse 
would not be characterized as an assault. Each 
case will, of course, be fact-specific, and the 
degree of any touching and the reaction to it will 
be relevant. Our conclusion should not be 
construed as a condonation of physical assault 
as a legitimate means of persuasion. [para. 42]
 
The accused’s right to remain silent was not 
breached and the confession was admissible. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed and his conviction 
upheld. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
UNKNOWNS JUSTIFY BRIEF & 
FOCUSSED HARD ENTRY
R. v. MacKay, 2012 ONCA 671
Canada Border Services officers 
opened a package addressed to the 
accused and discovered four wooden 
statues containing  hidden rough 
diamonds. The police obtained a 
general warrant authorizing  the installation of an 
alarm and a tracking  device in the package so that 
investigators would know when the package was 
opened. A controlled delivery of the package using 
an undercover officer posing  as a courier was made. 
The police decided to use its Emergency Response 
Team (ERT) due to two perceived security concerns:
1. Investigators were unable to conclusively 
identify the accused before the raid, precluding 
a complete threat assessment, and 
2. The accused’s office was located in a high rise 
commercial building  in the hub of Toronto’s 
jewellery district. Police knew that jewellers 
typically operated from offices equipped with 
controlled access doors, closed circuit security 
monitoring, and other security measures. 
Because of the potential high value of the 
diamonds, police were also concerned about 
the presence of weapons. 
About 10 minutes after the package was delivered, 
police received notification that it had been opened. 
The undercover officer immediately returned to the 
office, claiming  to have forgotten her gloves. She 
was buzzed through the outer door of the office. 
ERT, with weapons drawn, then breached the inner 
door and secured the premises. The accused was 
Volume 12 Issue 5 - September/October 2012
PAGE 23
arrested and ERT left the premises seven minutes 
after entry. The two-room office suite was searched 
and police seized 54 diamonds valued at about 
$12,900. The accused was charged with importing 
diamonds contrary to the Export and Import of 
Rough Diamonds Act and acquiring  illegally 
imported goods and smuggling  contrary to the 
Customs Act.
 
Ontario Court of Justice
At trial the judge concluded that the 
police planning  and threat assessment for 
the warrant’s execution was reasonable. 
“The officers took all, in my view, 
appropriate and reasonable steps to ensure that the 
search proposed to be conducted would be effective 
and not dangerous to any persons involved, 
including  the officers and the defendant and any 
other person who might be in the vicinity at the time 
of the search,” said the judge. “The officers’ original 
concerns were well founded and I do not fault the 
preparation that they took prior to the search being 
executed.” However, the judge found the manner in 
which the warrant was executed to be unreasonable. 
The entry of ERT members, each armed with two 
loaded firearms, was an unnecessary “show of 
significant arms.” In the judge’s view, the undercover 
officer could have simply approached the accused 
with the ERT show of force in the background, 
behind her at the doorway, to ensure that there was 
no difficulty with the arrest. The search was ruled 
unreasonable under s.8 of the Charter, the evidence 
was excluded and the accused was acquitted.
 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
A Crown appeal was successful. Since the 
police threat assessment was well-
founded and the presence of the ERT was 
reasonable, the trial judge’s finding  that a 
“show of force in the background” would have been 
adequate amounted to speculative second-guessing 
in hindsight. The appeal judge found the trial judge 
was judging  dynamic operational decisions made by 
the police with the benefit of hindsight and the 
determination that the precise placement of the 
officers was excessive amounted to an impermissible 
after-the-fact assessment. The accused’s acquittals 
were quashed and a new trial was ordered.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused then appealed, 
suggesting  the acquittals be 
reinstated. He did not challenge 
the initial police decision to deploy 
ERT in the raid on his office but asserted that the 
police had a duty to reassess the situation after the 
undercover officer entered the premises the first time 
which should have led to a decision to downgrade 
the “hard entry” nature of the raid to the point that 
the ERT would play a back-up role to regular police 
officers. But, as Justice MacPherson noted, the 
parameters for judicial review on the powers of a 
police tactical unit making  a “hard entry” include 
the following  propositions from R. v. Cornell, 2010 
SCC 31:
 
• The decision by the police must be judged by 
what was or should reasonably have been 
known to them at the time, not in light of how 
things turned out to be. Just as the Crown 
cannot rely on after-the-fact justifications for 
the search, the decision about how to conduct 
it cannot be attacked on the basis of 
circumstances that were not reasonably known 
to the police at the time. Whether there existed 
reasonable grounds for concern about safety or 
destruction of evidence must not be viewed 
“through the ‘lens of hindsight’”;
• The police must be allowed a certain amount of 
latitude in the manner in which they decide to 
enter premises. They cannot be expected to 
measure in advance with nuanced precision the 
amount of force the situation will require. It is 
often said of security measures that, if 
“Given the many unknowns, particularly the possibility of weapons inside the premises, 
there is no basis for concluding that the ERT ‘hard entry’ in this case – brief and focussed 
– amounted to an unreasonable search.”
Volume 12 Issue 5 - September/October 2012
PAGE 24
something  happens, the measures were 
inadequate but that if nothing  happens, they 
were excessive. These sorts of after-the-fact 
assessments are unfair and inappropriate when 
applied to situations like this where the officers 
must exercise discretion and judgment in 
difficult and fluid circumstances.  The role of 
the reviewing  court in assessing  the manner in 
which a search has been conducted is to 
appropriately balance the rights of suspects 
with the requirements of safe and effective law 
enforcement, not to become a Monday 
morning quarterback.
 
In this case, the trial judge erred in respect to both 
of these propositions. Even after the undercover 
officer had been inside the accused’s office, 
information critical to the imminent raid remained 
unknown, including: the size of the office, the 
number of rooms, the number of people inside and 
whether anyone inside had access to weapons. 
There was nothing  in the undercover officer’s brief 
visit to the premises to remove the extremely 
important concern about the presence of weapons. 
“Given the many unknowns, particularly the 
possibility of weapons inside the premises, there is 
no basis for concluding  that the ERT ‘hard entry’ in 
this case – brief and focussed – amounted to an 
unreasonable search,” said Justice MacPherson. 
There was no Charter breach, the accused’s appeal 
was dismissed and the order of a new trial was 
confirmed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“The relationship between debtors and creditors is 
common to both licit and illicit commerce. Debtors owe. 
Debtors are expected to pay. Creditors are owed. 
Creditors expect to be paid.
Some debtors pay their debts on time and in full. Others 
lag behind and require reminder or encouragement to 
discharge their obligations. The methods used to remind 
debtors of their obligations and to encourage repayment 
vary. Some follow conventional methods. Others take 
different approaches.
In this case, some drug purchasers fell behind in their 
payments to their suppliers. To remind them of their 
indebtedness and to encourage repayment, their suppliers 
shunned dunning letters and threats of litigation in favour 
of a more direct approach: a baton and a handgun.” 
Ontario Court of Appeal Justice Watt - R. v. Pelletier, 2012 ONCA 566
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‘REALISTIC RISK’ AN ESSENTIAL 
ELEMENT OF ‘CARE OR 
CONTROL’
R. v. Boudreault, 2012 SCC 56
The accused, inebriated and unfit to 
drive, decided to leave the apartment 
of a lady that he met earlier at a bar.  
He had her call for a taxi and it was 
expected that two drivers would 
attend — one to take him home and the other to 
drive his vehicle. He left the apartment into minus 
15 degrees Celsius weather with blowing  wind at 40 
km/h. He got into his truck — which was in a private 
driveway, on level terrain, its automatic transmission 
set to park — started the engine, turned on the heat 
and fell asleep. The taxi driver arrived about 45 
minutes after the first call and saw the accused 
sleeping  in the driver’s seat. Instead of waking  him, 
the driver called police. The accused’s ability to 
drive was manifestly impaired, he was arrested and 
subsequently provided two breathalyzer test samples 
of 250mg% and 242mg%. He was charged with 
impaired care or control and over 80mg% under s. 
253(1) of the Criminal Code. 
Court of Quebec
The trial judge held that there was no risk 
of the accused putting  the motor vehicle 
in motion and therefore care or control 
within the meaning  of s. 253(1) had not 
been established.  Although the accused was 
intoxicated, he knew what he was doing, took all the 
necessary precautions and had a concrete and 
reliable plan to get home without driving, which was 
thwarted when the very taxi driver he had been 
summoned called the police. The accused was 
acquitted of both counts.
Quebec Court of Appeal
T h e C r o w n ’s a p p e a l w a s 
allowed.  The Court of Appeal 
considered that an intention to 
drive was not an essential element 
to impaired care or control and the trial judge had 
therefore erred in considering  a lack of intention to 
drive as proof that there was no risk of setting  the 
vehicle in motion. In it’s view, “there was such a risk 
given the [accused’s] advanced state of intoxication, 
since his blood alcohol level was more than three 
times the legal limit and this might have greatly 
affected his judgment had he woken up”. 
Convictions were entered. 
Supreme Court of Canada
Th e a c c u s e d t h e n 
appealed to Canada’s 
Supreme Court. The 
Crown submitted that a 
risk of danger was not an essential element of the 
offence of care or control under s. 253(1) of the 
Criminal Code. In its view, even where the 
presumption of “care or control” under s. 258(1)(a) 
is not engaged, the Crown suggested it only needed 
to prove the voluntary consumption of alcohol 
beyond the legal limit or leading  to impairment and 
“some use of the car or its fittings and equipment.” 
Justice Fish, speaking  for himself and five other 
justices, however, disagreed. In his view, a realistic 
risk of danger is an essential element of “care or 
control” under s. 253(1). 
Risk of danger?
Justice Fish noted that Parliament’s objective in 
enacting  s. 253 was “to prevent a risk of danger to 
public safety.” Thus, an accused’s “conduct that 
presents no such risk falls outside the intended reach 
of the offence” because Parliament’s intention was to 
criminalize only conduct that creates a realistic risk 
of danger.
The essential elements of “care or control” under s. 
253(1) are:
1. an intentional course of conduct associated 
with a motor vehicle;
2. by a person whose ability to drive is impaired, 
or whose blood alcohol level exceeds the legal 
limit;
3. in circumstances that create a realistic risk of 
danger to persons or property.
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As noted, this risk of danger must be realistic and 
not just theoretically or remotely possible. However, 
the level of risk need not be probable, or even 
serious or substantial. Justice Fish stated:
To require that the risk be “realistic” is to 
establish a low threshold consistent with 
Parliament’s intention to prevent a danger to 
public safety. To require only that the risk be 
“theoretically possible” is to adopt too low a 
th re sho ld s ince i t wou ld c r imina l i ze 
unnecessarily a broad range of benign and 
inconsequential conduct. [para. 35]
And further:
A realistic risk that the vehicle will be set in 
motion obviously constitutes a realistic risk of 
danger. Accordingly, an intention to set the 
vehicle in motion suffices in itself to create the 
risk of danger contemplated by the offence of 
care or control. On the other hand, an accused 
who satisfies the court that he or she had no 
intention to set the vehicle in motion will not 
necessarily escape conviction:  An inebriated 
individual who is found behind the wheel and 
has a present ability to set the vehicle in motion 
— without intending  at that moment to do so — 
may nevertheless present a realistic risk of 
danger.
In the absence of a contemporaneous intention 
to drive, a realistic risk of danger may arise in at 
least three ways. First, an inebriated person who 
initially does not intend to drive may later, while 
still impaired, change his or her mind and 
proceed to do so; second, an inebriated person 
behind the wheel may unintentionally set the 
vehicle in motion; and third, through 
negligence, bad judgment or otherwise, a 
stationary or inoperable vehicle may endanger 
persons or property. [paras. 41-42]
The six member majority held that “anyone found 
inebriated and behind the wheel with a present 
ability to drive will — and should — almost 
invariably be convicted.” However, a conviction will 
not be “automatic” unless a realistic risk of danger 
(which is a finding  of fact), in the particular 
circumstances of the case, is established by the 
Crown. This is a low threshold which will normally 
be established by impairment or an excessive blood 
alcohol ratio behind the wheel of a motor vehicle 
with nothing  to stop an accused from setting  it in 
motion, either intentionally or accidentally. Then, to 
avoid conviction, an accused will in practice face a 
tactical necessity of adducing  credible and reliable 
evidence tending  to prove that the inherent risk of 
danger is not a realistic risk in the particular 
circumstances of the case. For example, an accused 
may escape conviction “by adducing  evidence that 
the motor vehicle was inoperable or, on account of 
its location or placement, could, under no 
reasonably conceivable circumstances, pose a risk of 
danger. Likewise, use of the vehicle for a manifestly 
innocent purpose should not attract the stigma of a 
criminal conviction.”  
Alternate Plan
In this case, the accused had an “alternate plan” to 
ensure his safe transportation home. The affect an 
alternate plan has on the risk involved depends on 
two considerations. First, whether the accused’s plan 
was objectively concrete and reliable. And second, 
was the plan in fact implemented by the 
accused. Justice Fish continued:
A plan may seem watertight, but the accused’s 
level of impairment, demeanour or actions may 
demonstrate that there was nevertheless a 
realistic risk that the plan would be abandoned 
before its implementation.   Where judgment is 
impaired by alcohol, it cannot be lightly 
assumed that the actions of the accused when 
behind the wheel will accord with his or her 
intentions either then or afterward.
For example, even where it is certain that the 
taxi will show up at some point, if the accused 
occupied the driver’s seat without a valid excuse 
or reasonable explanation, this alone may 
“[C]are or control”, within the meaning of s. 253(1) of the Criminal Code, signifies (1) an 
intentional course of conduct associated with a motor vehicle; (2) by a person whose ability to 
drive is impaired, or whose blood alcohol level exceeds the legal limit; (3) in circumstances that 
create a realistic risk, as opposed to a remote possibility, of danger to persons or property.
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persuade the judge that “his judgment [was] so 
impaired that he [could not] foresee the possible 
consequences of his actions”. The converse, 
however, is not necessarily true.  Even where it is 
probable that the taxi will appear at some point 
and the accused occupied the driver’s seat with 
a valid excuse or reasonable explanation, the 
trial judge may nonetheless be satisfied beyond 
a reasonable doubt that there remained a 
realistic risk of danger in the circumstances. 
[reference omitted, paras. 52-53]
In this case, the Crown only alleged that the accused 
would, at some point, intentionally set his vehicle in 
motion thereby causing  a risk of danger. The trial 
judge applied the correct legal test to the evidence 
and concluded there was no risk that the accused 
would at any point intentionally set the vehicle in 
motion. He also correctly recognized that the 
absence of an intention to drive was only relevant to 
rebutting  the presumption in s. 258(1)(a) and that a 
risk of danger was an essential element of care or 
control. Even if the trial judge’s findings of fact were 
viewed unsatisfactory or unreasonable to others, 
these findings were not reviewable on the Crown’s 
appeal. The accused’s appeal was allowed, the 
judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal was set 
aside and the acquittals were restored.
 
A Different View
Justice Cromwell, delivering  a dissenting 
judgment, was of the opinion that a risk 
of danger, whether realistic or otherwise, 
was not an element of the offence of care 
or control.  He found that such an interpretation 
would seriously undercut the provision’s preventive 
purpose. In his view, a person “is in care or control 
of a motor vehicle when one acts to assume the 
present ability to operate the vehicle or has its 
superintendence or management.” Finally, even if 
the creation of a risk was an essential element of the 
offence, Justice Cromwell concluded that the trial 
judge erred in law by finding  that it had not been 
proven in this case.  He would have dismissed the 
accused’s appeal.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
‘CARE or CONTROL’ under s. 253(1) of the Criminal Code requires (1) an intentional 
course of conduct associated with a motor vehicle; (2) by a person whose ability to drive is impaired, or whose 
blood alcohol level exceeds the legal limit; (3) in circumstances that create a realistic risk of danger to persons or 
property. There are two ways the Crown can prove this. 
Presumptive Care or Control Non-Presumptive (Actual or De Facto) Care or Control 
• s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code creates a legal 
presumption which provides that an accused who 
was found in the driver’s seat of a motor vehicle 
“shall be deemed to have had the care or control of 
the vehicle . . . unless the accused establishes that 
the accused did not occupy that seat or position for 
the purpose of setting the vehicle . . . in motion . . .”
• This reverse onus provision can be rebutted if the 
accused establishes they had no intention to drive. 
• An inebriated person found behind the wheel cannot 
be convicted of care or control if that person satisfies 
the court that he or she had no intention to set the 
vehicle in motion. 
• If the presumption is rebutted, care or control can 
nonetheless be established by proving non-
presumptive care or control.
• An intention to drive is not an essential element of 
the offence.
• There must be a realistic risk of danger to persons or 
property. This is a low threshold which is more than 
a theoretical or remote possibility, but less than a 
probable, serious or substantial risk.
• An intention to set the vehicle in motion is sufficient 
in itself to create a realistic risk of danger.
• A realistic risk of danger may also arise when:
1.  an inebriated person who initially does not 
intend to drive may later, while still impaired, 
change his or her mind and proceed to do so; 
2. an inebriated person behind the wheel may 
unintentionally set the vehicle in motion; or
3. through negligence, bad judgment or otherwise, a 
stationary or inoperable vehicle may endanger 
persons or property.
The British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police, the 
Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, and the 
Justice Institute of British Columbia, Police Academy are 
hosting the Police Leadership Conference in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. This is Canada's largest police leadership 
conference. This Police Leadership Conference will provide 
an opportunity for delegates to hear leadership topics 
discussed by world-renowned speakers.
Leadership in policing is not bound by position or rank and 
this conference will provide delegates from the police 
community with an opportunity to engage in a variety of 
leadership areas. The Police Leadership Conference will 
bring together experts who will provide current, lively, and 
interesting topics on leadership. The carefully chosen list of 
keynote speakers will provide a first class opportunity at a 
first class venue to hear some of the world's outstanding 
authorities on leadership, the challenges facing the policing 
community and how to overcome those challenges.
The Service of Policing:               
Meeting Public Expectation
April 7 - 9, 2013
www.policeleadershipconference.com
Rick Mercer chronicles, satirizes and ultimately celebrates all that is great and irreverent about this 
country. Known as "Canada's Unofficial Opposition," Mercer is our most popular comic, a political 
satirist who knows exactly what matters to regular Canadians and what makes them laugh. Born in 
St. John's, Newfoundland, Mercer has won over 25 Gemini Awards.                                          
Assembly of First Nations National Chief Shawn A-in-chut Atleo is a Hereditary Chief from the 
Ahousaht First Nation. In July 2009, Atleo was elected to a three-year mandate as National Chief to 
the Assembly of First Nations. Atleo has been a tireless advocate for First Nations by spending time 
in First Nations in every region of the country.
Craig Kielburger co-founded, with his brother Marc, Free The Children in 1995 at only 12 years of 
age. Today, he remains a passionate full-time volunteer for the organization, now an international 
charity and renowned educational partner that empowers youth to achieve their fullest potential as 
agents of change.
Wendy Mesley is a regular contributor to CBC News: The National, CBC Television’s flagship news 
program, appearing throughout the week in a regular segment that asks provocative questions about 
the news stories Canadians are talking about. She also contributes to CBC News: Marketplace, CBC 
Television's award-winning prime-time investigative consumer show. 
Richard Rosenthal was appointed BC’s first Chief Civilian Director of the Independent Investigations 
Office on January 9, 2012. He has extensive experience in civilian oversight of law enforcement 
having served for 15 years as deputy district attorney for Los Angeles County, where he worked on 
various assignments.
Ian McPherson is a Partner, Advisory Services with KPMG in Toronto and the former Assistant 
Commissioner of Territorial Policing at the Metropolitan Police Service in London, UK. Ian is with 
KPMG's Global Centre of Excellence for Justice and Security, leading its work throughout North 
America.
Major-General (ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie is considered the most experienced peacekeeper on the 
planet. MacKenzie has commanded troops from dozens of countries in some of the world's most 
dangerous places. In Sarajevo, during the Bosnian Civil War, he famously managed to open the 
Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
Dr. John Izzo has devoted his life and career to helping leaders create workplaces that bring out the 
best in people, plus discover more purpose and fulfillment in life and work. For over 20 years, he has 
pioneered employee engagement, helping organizations create great corporate cultures and leading 
brands through transformations that create both customer and employee loyalty.
In an increasingly social world, Susan Cain shifts our focus to help us reconsider the role of introverts 
- outlining their many strengths and vital contributions. Like A Whole New Mind and Stumbling on 
Happiness, Cain's book, Quiet: The Power of Introverts In a World That Can't Stop Talking, is a 
paradigm-changing lodestar that shows how dramatically our culture has come to misunderstand and 
undervalue introverts. 
Speakers
Foundational Courses:
Intelligence Theories and  Applications
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Intelligence Communications
Specialized Courses:
Competitive Intelligence
Analyzing Financial Crimes
Tactical Criminal Intelligence 
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence
Entrance Requirements:
Proof of completion of bachelor degree;  OR
A minimum of two years of post secondary 
education plus a minimum of five years
of progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information.  Applicants must also write a 
500 – 1000 word essay on a related topic of 
their choice OR
Applicants who have not completed a 
minimum of 2 years post-secondary 
education must have eight to ten years of 
progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information (Dean/Director discretion).  
Applicants are required to write a 500-1000 
word essay on a related topic of their 
choice.
For detailed requirements please visit the 
JIBC Website.
ONLINE GRADUATE CERTIFICATE PROGRAMS
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS | TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Justice Institute of British Columbia, Canada | www.jibc.ca |graduatestudies@jibc.ca
Foundational Courses
(students enrolled in either graduate certificate are required to complete the 
foundational courses)
Intelligence Theories and Applications
A survey course that introduces the student 
to the discipline of intelligence and provides 
the student with an understanding of how 
intelligence systems function, how they fit 
within the policymaking systems of free 
societies, and how they are managed and 
controlled. The course will integrate 
intelligence theory with the methodology 
and processes that evolved over time to 
assist the intelligence professional. The 
course will develop in the student a range 
of advanced research and thinking skills 
fundamental to the intelligence analysis 
process.
Intelligence Communications
The skill most appreciated by 
the intelligence consumer is the 
ability to communicate, briefly 
and effectively, the results of 
detailed analytic work. This 
course, through repetitive 
application of a focused set of 
skills to a body of information of 
constantly increasing 
complexity, is designed to 
prepare intelligence analysts to 
deliver a variety of intelligence 
products in both written and oral 
formats.
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Topics include: drug/terrorism/other 
intelligence issues, advanced 
analytic techniques (including 
strategic analysis, predicative 
intelligence etc.), collection 
management, intelligence sources, 
management theory (large 
organizations), attacking criminal 
organizations, crisis management, 
negotiation techniques, strategic 
planning, local/regional updates 
and briefing techniques.
Specialized Courses
(students enrolled in either graduate certificate are required to complete the 
foundational courses)
Intelligence Analysis Tactical Criminal Analysis
Competitive Intelligence 
This course explores the business processes involved in 
providing foreknowledge of the competitive environment; the 
prelude to action and decision. The course focuses on 
supporting decisions with predictive insights derived from 
intelligence gathering practices and methodologies used in the 
private sector. Lectures, discussions, and projects focus on the 
desires and expectations of business decision-makers to gain 
first-mover advantage and act more quickly than the 
competition.
Analyzing Financial Crimes
This course examines the nature and scope of financial crimes 
and many of the tools used by law enforcement in the 
preparation of a financial case. Included in this course is a 
detailed treatment of the following: laws which serve to aid in 
the detection and prosecution of these crimes, the types of 
business records available, types of bank records available, an 
examination of offshore business and banking operations, and 
the collection and analysis of this information, with emphasis 
placed on Net Worth and Expenditure Analysis. In addition, 
special treatment is given to the detection and prosecution of 
money laundering, various types of money laundering 
schemes, and the relationship of money laundering to 
terrorism.
Tactical Criminal Intelligence
This course is an introduction to law enforcement 
terminology, practices, concepts, analysis, and 
intelligence. The course will introduce the student to 
the discipline of crime analysis and law enforcement 
intelligence through the study of the intelligence 
cycle and the intelligence determinants. The role and 
responsibilities of an analyst within each sub-topic 
will be addressed. Additionally, the utilization of 
analytical software will be introduced.
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence 
The course reviews the key requirements for 
intelligence in law enforcement and homeland 
security. The course focuses the use of advanced 
analytic methodologies to analyze structured and 
unstructured law enforcement data produced by all 
source collection. Students will apply these 
concepts, using a variety of tools, to develop 
descriptive, explanatory, and estimative products 
and briefings for decision-makers in the field.
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